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Abstract
This paper proposes a formal model of the Bellare-Rogaway type [1] that enables one
to prove the security of an anonymous credential system in a complexity theoretic frame-
work. The model abstracts away from how a specific instance of anonymous credential sys-
tem achieves its goals; instead it defines what these goals are. The notions of credential
unforgeability, non-transferability, pseudonym unlinkability and pseudonym owner protection
are formally defined and the relationships between them are explored. The model is a step to-
wards a formal treatment of the level of privacy protection that anonymous credential systems
can and should achieve, both in terms of pseudonym unlinkability and user anonymity.
Keywords: anonymous credential systems, pseudonym systems, privacy, anonymity, unlink-
ability, provable security.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
Anonymous credential or ‘pseudonym’ systems allow users to interact with organisations using
distinct and unlinkable pseudonyms. In particular, a user can obtain a credential (a statement of
a designated type that attests to one or more of the user’s attributes) from one organisation and
then ‘show’ it to another, such that the two organisations cannot link the issuing and showing
acts; this renders the user’s transactions unlinkable. Of course this unlinkability is limited; if only
one credential is ever issued with a particular set of attributes, then clearly all credential showings
containing this set of attributes can be linked to each other and to the unique issued credential.
Pseudonym systems must prevent users from showing credentials that have not been issued (i.e.
they must guarantee ‘credential unforgeability’), and prevent users from pooling their credentials
(for example, to collectively obtain a new credential that each user individually would not be able
to). This latter property is usually referred to as ‘credential non-transferability’.
Security models of pseudonym systems, and proofs (where given), do not usually allow rea-
soning about the resulting degrees of user anonymity and pseudonym unlinkability. This paper,
following the ideas first set out by Bellare and Rogaway in [1], proposes a model that is based on
complexity theoretic arguments and which potentially leads to information theoretic anonymity
∗The author is sponsored by the State Scholarship Foundation of Greece.
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metrics. It abstracts away from the particulars of how specific pseudonym system instances achieve
their goals; instead it focuses on what these goals are. The model captures security properties for
both organisations (credential unforgeability and non-transferability), and users, both in terms
of ‘traditional’ security (pseudonym owner protection) and privacy (pseudonym unlinkability and
user anonymity). The model makes a clear distinction between the different notions and allows
the relationships between them to be analysed.
1.2 Related work
Pseudonym systems were first introduced by Chaum in the 1980s [4]. Since then, numerous
pseudonym systems have been proposed, each with its own particular set of entities, underlying
problems, assumptions and properties. Examples of such systems are given in [2, 3, 5, 6]. The
most relevant work to this paper is probably the formal treatment of the anonymous credential
system in [3]. There, security is defined based on the indistinguishability between the transcripts of
protocols that occur in an ‘ideal’ world (where a universally trusted party guarantees security), and
the ‘real world’ (where such a party does not exist). In that model, transactions between users and
organisations correspond to well-defined events, and the adversary acts like an event scheduler; he
can arbitrarily trigger events of his choice. In the model of [3], however, the relationship between
the different security notions that a pseudonym system should satisfy is somewhat hidden by the
fact that the universally trusted party takes care of them. Also, in that model, the adversary is
not allowed to corrupt players in an adaptive fashion. While our model retains the property that
the adversary gets to specify the order of events in the system, he can also adaptively corrupt
players. Further, the model allows a relatively easy analysis of the relationships between different
notions. This is due to the fact that we abstract away from properties that do not lie at the same
level of abstraction as that at which a pseudonym system operates.
1.3 What we do not do
Our model does not capture ‘traditional’ communications security properties, such as entity au-
thentication. This is not an omission; these issues are outside the scope of the model (other
well-established security models can be used to reason about such issues). Of course, if users do
not authenticate organisations, and if the communications in the system are not appropriately
protected at the session level1, then there cannot be any security. However, the way these services
are provided lies at a different level of abstraction. We therefore assume that they are provided
by the infrastructure that allows users and organisations to communicate. We also assume that,
within this infrastructure, users remain anonymous to organisations (i.e. we assume an anonymous
user-to-organisation channel).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the formal
model of pseudonym systems. Section 2.2 establishes the notions of pseudonym owner protection,
credential unforgeability and credential non-transferability, which together capture the notions
of soundness for a scheme. Further, section 2.3 provides a brief discussion of the notions and
explains the relationships between them. Section 2.4 establishes the notion of pseudonym unlink-
ability which is discussed in section 2.5. Section 2.6 then establishes the notion of pseudonym
indistinguishability and shows it is a necessary condition for unlinkability. Finally, section 2.7
addresses the issue of anonymity in pseudonym systems, while section 3 concludes the paper and
gives directions for further research.
1What it means for communications to be ‘appropriately protected at the session level’ may vary from system to
system. Typically, it means that each protocol execution is bound to exactly one conversation between the involved
parties. It may also imply protection of the integrity and confidentiality of the communications occurring within
the session.
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2 Security of pseudonym systems
In this section we describe our model of a pseudonym system. We regard a pseudonym system
as being comprised of the players in the system and the procedures through which they interact.
The players, in particular, are divided into users, issuing organisations and verifying organisations.
Since users are known to each organisation under a different pseudonym, indeed possibly under
multiple pseudonyms, a procedure must be in place according to which a user and an organisation
establish a new pseudonym; we call this the ‘pseudonym establishment protocol’. Procedures must
also be in place that allow users to obtain credentials (using the pseudonym that was established
with the issuer) and to show them (using the pseudonym that was established with the verifier).
We call the former the ‘credential issuing protocol’ and the latter the ‘credential showing protocol’.
In our model, credential types are in one-to-one correspondence with (combinations of) user
attributes; in other words, each combination of attributes defines a credential type. An organisa-
tion that, for example, issues demographic credentials containing the fields sex and age group,
with possible values of {male,female} and {18-,18-30,30-50,50+} respectively, in our model
may actually issue credentials of up to eight different types (one for each combination of values).
2.1 The model
A protocol prot is assumed to be a tuple of interactive Turing machines; an execution of prot is
said to be successful if and only if all machines accept. The set of all non-zero polynomial functions
in the natural number k is denoted by poly(k). A real-valued function ² : N → R, is said to be
negligible in k if and only if 0 ≤ ²(k) < 1/|q(k)| for any q ∈ poly(k) and for all sufficiently large k.
Remark 1 We are concerned in this paper with situations where two functions f and g satisfy
f(k) > g(k) + ²(k) for any negligible function ² and for all sufficiently large k. To simplify the
discussion we abuse our notation slightly and simply say that f is greater than g + ²(k), i.e. we
omit explicit references to k, and we also omit the rider ‘for all sufficiently large k’.
Definition 1 A pseudonym system is a tuple
(U, I, V, k, init, P, T, peprot, ciprot, csprot)
whose elements are as follows.
• U is the set of users.
• I is the set of credential issuing organisations (‘issuers’ in short).
• V is the set of credential verifying organisations (‘verifiers’ in short).
• k (a natural number) is the system security parameter.
• init is the initialisation algorithm; on input (U, I, V, k), it outputs descriptions of the sets P
and T . Depending on the particular scheme, it may also output public parameters and private
values for (a subset of) the players in the scheme, i.e. users, issuers and verifiers.
• P is the set of pseudonyms.
• T is the set of credential types.
• peprot is the pseudonym establishment protocol: any user/organisation pair (u, o) ∈ U ×
(I ∪ V ) may execute peprot; if the protocol succeeds, u and o will have established a
pseudonym p ∈ P and we write peprotu,o,p. (The user u is called the owner of p, and
will typically also possess some private output associated with p as necessary to engage in
ciprot and csprot.)
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• ciprot is the credential issuing protocol: any user/issuer pair (u, i) ∈ U × I may execute
ciprot with respect to a pseudonym p ∈ P associated with u and i (established using peprot)
and for a particular credential type t ∈ T . If successful, we say that i has issued a credential
of type t on pseudonym p to u, and we write ciproti,p,t.
• csprot is the credential showing protocol: any user/verifier pair (u, v) ∈ U×V may execute
csprot with respect to a pseudonym p ∈ P associated with u and v (established using peprot)
and for a particular credential type t ∈ T ; if the protocol succeeds we say that u has shown
a credential of type t on pseudonym p to s and we write csprotv,p,t.
Each issuer i ∈ I defines a set Ti ⊆ T of credential types that it intends to issue in the future2.
It is required that, for all distinct i, i′ ∈ I, Ti ∩ Ti′ = ∅3. We denote the set of active credential
types in the system by T ∗
def
=
⋃
i∈I Ti. It is required that |T ∗| ∈ poly(k). Also note that, by
definition, |U | ∈ poly(k), |I| ∈ poly(k) and |V | ∈ poly(k).
2.2 The games and soundness
In order to formalise our notions of security for a pseudonym system, we define a series of games
between two Turing machines: a Challenger and an Adversary. Each game captures a specific
property of the pseudonym system. In this section we define Game 1, which captures ‘pseudonym
owner protection’, Game 2, which captures ‘credential unforgeability’, and Game 3, which captures
‘credential non-transferability’. In sections 2.4 and 2.6 below we define Game 4 and Game 5, which
capture ‘unlinkability’ and ‘indistinguishability’ of pseudonyms, respectively.
At the beginning of all games, the Challenger sets up the system by selecting the set of
users U , issuers I, verifiers V , and a security paramenter k and by running init with these as
input. At this point, the Challenger controls all the players in the system. He defines the sets Ti
for each issuer. The Adversary, which is assumed to be a probabilistic polynomial time (and space)
algorithm and is denoted by A, then receives as input the sets U , I, V and Ti, descriptions of
the sets P and T , and the system’s public information. As explained above, it is assumed that
the underlying communication infrastructure appropriately protects the communications between
users and organisations at the session level. Thus, A models a passive adversary that faithfully
transmits messages between parties.
Each of the games consists of two distinct and successive phases. During the first phase of
each game, A may issue (oracle type) queries to the Challenger; during the second phase he may
not. During the first phase of Game 1, 2 and 3, A may issue the following types of query to the
Challenger.
runpeprot(u, o): A may arbitrarily select a user/organisation pair (u, o) ∈ U × (I ∪ V )
and issue this query. When this happens, the Challenger makes u and o execute peprotu,o,p.
The Challenger replies true if the protocol execution is successful and false otherwise. (If the
execution is successful, u and o will have established a new pseudonym p ∈ P ; A, however, does
not learn its value.)
runciprot(u, i, t): A may arbitrarily select a user/issuer pair (u, i) ∈ U × I and a credential
type t ∈ Ti and issue this query. When this happens, the Challenger selects a pseudonym p from
set of pseudonyms that u and i have established4 and makes u and i execute ciproti,p,t. He
replies true if the protocol execution is successful and false otherwise (including the case where
u and i have not established any pseudonym). Note that A does not learn the value of p.
2In certain existing pseudonym systems, credential types are identified with some form of public verification key.
These keys are typically published.
3This is easily achieved by having a unique identifier of each i embedded into all its types Ti.
4We do not specify the probability distribution according to which the Challenger selects p from the set of
pseudonyms u has established, since this should not affect security.
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runcsprot(u, v, t): Amay arbitrarily select a user/verifier pair (u, v) ∈ U×V and a credential
type t ∈ T and issue this query. When this happens, the Challenger selects a pseudonym p from
the set of pseudonyms that u and v have established and makes u and v execute csprotv,p,t. He
replies true if the protocol execution is successful and false otherwise (including the case where
u and v have not established any pseudonym). Note that A does not learn the value of p.
corruptUser(u): A may arbitrarily select a user u ∈ U and issue this query. When this
happens, the Challenger hands all the private information of u to A. This includes u’s pseudonyms,
credentials and all his past protocol views. From that point on, the control of u is passed from
the Challenger to A.
corruptIssuer(i): A may arbitrarily select an issuer i ∈ I and issue this query. When this
happens, the Challenger hands all the private information of i to A. This includes the set of
pseudonyms i has established and all its past protocol views. From that point on, the control of i
is passed from the Challenger to A.
corruptVerifier(v): A may arbitrarily select a verifier v ∈ V and issue this query. When
this happens, the Challenger hands all the private information of v to A. This includes the set of
pseudonyms v has established and all its past protocol views. From that point on, the control of
v is passed from the Challenger to A.
In all games, a global and monotonically increasing variable τ counts A’s queries. We say
that the query is issued at the time indicated by τ . At some point in time, A exits the first phase
and enters the second phase. The value of τ at that point is denoted by τmax. In the second phase
A may no longer issue any queries; what happens is specific to each game and is described below.
To describe the games we require some additional notation. In the following, Pu,o ⊆ P
denotes the set of pseudonyms the user u ∈ U has established with the organisation o ∈ (I ∪ V )
at time τmax (via A’s peprot queries), i.e. Pu,o def= {p ∈ P | a successful peprotu,o,p occurred at
a time τ ≤ τmax}. The set of pseudonyms belonging to u is defined as Pu def=
⋃
o∈(I∪V ) Pu,o and
the set of pseudonyms that o has established is defined as Po
def
=
⋃
u∈U Pu,o. (Since A does not
learn the value of pseudonyms during their establishment, only u knows Pu and only o knows
Po.) The set of active pseudonyms in the system is defined as P ∗
def
=
⋃
u∈U Pu, or, equivalently,
P ∗
def
=
⋃
o∈(I∪V ) Po. Since A is polynomially bounded in k, it holds that |P ∗| ∈ poly(k). It is
required that, for all distinct u, u′ ∈ U , Pu∩Pu′ = ∅5. The function f : P ∗ → U maps pseudonyms
to their owners, which is well-defined by the assumption that Pu ∩ Pu′ = ∅.
Let Uˆ ⊆ U , Iˆ ⊆ I and Vˆ ⊆ V denote the subsets of users, issuers and verifiers respectively
that A corrupted during the first phase. Further, let Pu,t(x) ⊆ Pu denote the subset of pseudonyms
belonging to user u ∈ U on which a credential of type t ∈ T ∗ has been issued prior to time x, i.e.
Pu,t(x)
def
= {p ∈ Pu | a successful ciprot·,p,t occurred at time τ ≤ x}.
We now describe the second phase of Games 1, 2 and 3. As mentioned above, A may no
longer issue queries to the Challenger in this phase. He may, however, engage in ciprotp,i,t and
csprotp,v,t executions directly with organisations (while pretending to be the user f(p)).
Game 1 (pseudonym owner protection): A selects a pseudonym/verifier/type triple (p, v, t) ∈
P ∗ × (V − Vˆ ) × T such that f(p) ∈ (U − Uˆ). We say that A wins the game iff he can make v
accept in a csprotp,v,t execution.
Game 2 (credential unforgeability): A selects a pseudonym/verifier/type triple (p, v, t) ∈ P ∗ ×
(V − Vˆ )× (T −⋃i∈Iˆ Ti) such that Pf(p),t(τmax) = ∅ and ⋃u∈Uˆ Pu,t(τmax) = ∅. We say that A wins
the game iff he can make v accept in a csprotp,v,t execution.
5This requirement is a technicality that we need in order to define the function f . It practice it can be met by
having peprot select pseudonyms uniformly at random from a large enough set P . The pseudonym establishment
protocols of some existing schemes are of this form.
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Game 3 (credential non-transferability): A selects a pseudonym/verifier/type triple (p, v, t) ∈
P ∗× (V − Vˆ )× (T −⋃i∈Iˆ Ti) such that Pf(p),t(τmax) = ∅. We say that A wins the game iff he can
make v accept in a csprotv,p,t execution.
Definition 2 A pseudonym system is said to offer pseudonym owner protection, credential un-
forgeability or credential non-transferability if and only if no adversary A can win Game 1, 2 or 3,
respectively, with a probability greater than any negligible function in k.
2.3 Discussion
Game 1, ‘pseudonym owner protection’, captures security for users; nobody — even when colluding
with users, issuers and verifiers — should be able to successfully show a credential on a pseudonym
of which he is not the owner (i.e. on a pseudonym which was not established by himself). The
property is typically achieved by having the pseudonym establishment protocol generate some
private output for the user. This output is then treated as a secret that enables the user to
authenticate himself as the pseudonym owner during the execution of the credential issuing and
showing protocols.
Games 2 and 3 capture security for organisations. In particular, Game 2 captures what is
usually perceived as ‘credential unforgeability’. If a (dishonest) user can construct a credential
by himself (i.e. without obtaining it legitimately from an issuing organisation), if, in other words,
the user can forge the credential, then the system clearly does not offer credential unforgeability.
Game 2 captures unforgeability in this sense. There is, however, a simplistic way for a user to
‘forge’ a credential, namely by ‘borrowing’ it from another user with whom he colludes (and who
legitimately obtained the credential from an issuing organisation). This type of ‘forgery’ is not
captured by Game 2. In some applications credential sharing is not a concern, while forgery is.
Game 3, credential non-transferability, captures the case of credential sharing between users.
In a system that offers credential non-transferability, no user can successfully show a credential of
a type he was never issued. This holds even in the case the user colludes with other users that
have been issued credentials of that type.
It is interesting to observe the relationship between the notions of unforgeability and non-
transferability: the latter, being stronger, implies the former. Clearly, if a dishonest user can
construct credentials by himself, there is no need for him to collude with other users in order to
forge one. In the model, this is simply reflected by the fact that the adversary is more restricted in
his choice of the credential type in the (second phase of) Game 2 than he is in the (second phase
of) Game 3. A system that offers non-transferability also offers unforgeability.
This relationship between unforgeability and non-transferability motivates the following def-
inition of a sound pseudonym system.
Definition 3 A pseudonym system is said to be sound if it offers pseudonym owner protection
and credential non-transferability.
As a side comment, note that non-transferability of credentials is probably the most chal-
lenging property for a pseudonym system to achieve. How can colluding users be prevented from
sharing their credentials? Certainly, if two users share all their secrets, then they can act as each
other in all circumstances. Thus, one will always have to assume that users will not share all their
secrets, either because they will be prevented by some means, e.g. by the use of tamper-resistant
hardware, or because they will be given a sufficiently strong incentive not to. Examples of schemes
that follow the latter strategy include the ones in [7], where sharing credentials implies sharing
a highly valued key (this is called ‘PKI-assured non-transferability’), and [3], where sharing one
credential implies sharing all credentials (this is called ‘all-or-nothing non-transferability’).
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2.4 Unlinkability of pseudonyms
We now define Game 4 in order to capture the first privacy property required of pseudonym
systems, i.e. the property of pseudonym unlinkability. A second (weaker) privacy property is
defined in section 2.6.
In the first phase of the Game 4, A is allowed to issue queries from the following set of query
types, which are similar but not identical to the first three query types of section 2.2.
runpeprot(o): A may arbitrarily select an organisation o ∈ (I ∪ V ) and issue this query.
When this happens, the Challenger selects a user u according to a probability distribution D from
U and makes u and o execute peprotu,o,p. He replies true if the protocol execution is successful
and false otherwise. (If the execution is successful, A knows that u and o have established a new
pseudonym p ∈ P but learns neither p nor the identity of its owner.)
runciprot(p, i, t): A may arbitrarily select a pseudonym/issuer pair (p, i) ∈ P × I and a
credential type t ∈ Ti and issue this query. When this happens, the Challenger selects the owner
of p and makes him execute ciproti,p,t with i. He replies true if the protocol execution is
successful and false otherwise (including the case where p has no owner). Note that A does not
learn who the owner of p is.
runcsprot(p, v, t): A may arbitrarily select a pseudonym/verifier pair (p, v) ∈ P × V and a
credential type t ∈ T and issue this query. When this happens, the Challenger selects the owner of
p and makes him execute csprotv,p,t with v. He replies true if the protocol execution is successful
and false otherwise (including the case where p has no owner). Note that A does not learn who
the owner of p is.
corruptUser(u): As in section 2.2.
corruptIssuer(i): As in section 2.2.
corruptVerifier(u): As in section 2.2.
We now describe the second phase of the Game 4. We denote the set of pseudonyms that
belong to uncorrupted users by P ∗∗
def
= P ∗ −⋃u∈Uˆ Pu.
Game 4 (pseudonym unlinkability): A outputs two distinct pseudonyms p1, p2 ∈ P ∗∗. We say
that A wins the game iff f(p1) = f(p2).
A may apply a variety of strategies in his effort to correlate pseudonyms. We now consider
what is probably the most naive strategy and arrive at the following simple result.
Lemma 1 If the Challenger, during runpeprot(o) queries of an instance of Game 4, selects users
uniformly at random (i.e. D is the uniform distribution), and two pseudonyms, p1, p2 say, are
chosen at random from P ∗∗, then the probability that f(p1) = f(p2) is 1/|U − Uˆ |.
Proof Suppose f(p1) = u ∈ (U − Uˆ). Then the probability that f(p2) = u is 1/|U − Uˆ |,
since the pseudonyms are allocated uniformly at random to users, and hence also to uncorrupted
users. The result follows. ¤
Thus it is tempting to define a pseudonym system that offers unlinkability of pseudonyms
as a system where A cannot win the Game 4 with probability greater than 1/|U − Uˆ | + ²(k) for
any negligible function ². However, this is only a reasonable definition of unlinkability if D is the
uniform distribution and if no credentials are shown during the first phase of the game, i.e. there
are no instances of runcsprot. Any instance of runcsprot potentially provides the adversary
with information about possible links between pseudonyms, and hence potentially increases the
adversary’s probability of success in linking pseudonyms. Thus, the definition of pseudonym
unlinkability needs to take this additional information into account.
Assuming a sound pseudonym system, there are two types of deduction that can be made.
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• Suppose a runcsprot invocation, say runcsprot(p, v, t) for some p, v and t, issued at time
τ , returns true. Then A can deduce that there exists some p′ ∈ ⋃u∈U Pu,t(τ) such that
f(p) = f(p′).
• Suppose a runcsprot invocation, say runcsprot(p, v, t) for some p, v and t, issued at time
τ , returns false. Then A can deduce that f(p) 6= f(p′) for all p′ ∈ ⋃u∈U Pu,t(τ).
In any instance of Game 4, which in its first phase will involve a series of queries, A will
be able to make a series of deductions about matchings of pseudonyms based on the outcomes
({true,false}) of runcsprot queries (as above). As a result, for each pair of distinct pseudonyms
p1, p2 ∈ P ∗∗, A will be able to compute the probability Pp1,p2 that f(p1) = f(p2) based on these
observations (assuming that A makes optimal use of the information provided). In computing
Pp1,p2 we suppose that A also takes into account the probability distribution D used by the
Challenger to select the user during runpeprot queries.
We now define P¯ to be the maximum of these probabilities, i.e.
P¯
def
= max
p1,p2∈P∗∗
p1 6=p2
(Pp1,p2).
We can now define the notion of pseudonym unlinkability.
Definition 4 A sound pseudonym system is said to offer pseudonym unlinkability iff no A can
win Game 4 with probability greater than P¯ + ²(k) for any negligible function ².
An example scenario of how the two types of deduction might be applied in order to calculate
P¯ , is given in the Appendix.
2.5 Discussion
In real life, colluding organisations could come up with many more effective strategies in order to
correlate pseudonyms. Examples include attacks that take into account information such as the
time or the geographical location of events that occur in the system. These attacks, however, are
not captured by the model, simply because they lie at a different level of abstraction. Protection
against, say, timing attacks, de-anonymising traffic analysis or social engineering, is required ir-
respectively of which particular pseudonym system is being used. The only adversarial strategies
to correlate pseudonyms that are inherent in the system, and therefore lie at the same level of
abstraction, are the following.
1. If some user is asked for but fails to produce a credential of a given type, the colluding
organisations know that none of the pseudonyms on which a credential of that type was
previously issued belongs to that user.
2. If some user successfully shows a credential of a given type on one of his pseudonyms, the
colluding organisations know that at least one of the pseudonyms on which a credential of
that type was previously issued belongs to that user.
These strategies are captured by the probability bound P¯ . A pseudonym system cannot
protect against these strategies without breaching one of its essential properties: that of credential
non-transferability. In other words, if a (sound) pseudonym system satisfies Definition 4, this
means that the probability that pseudonyms can be successfully linked does not exceed the given
bound (by a non-negligible quantity), provided that no ‘out-of-scope’ attacks place.
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2.6 Indistinguishability of pseudonyms
We now establish our second privacy property, namely the notion of indistinguishability of pseudonyms
and show that it is a necessary condition for pseudonym unlinkability.
Consider the following game between a Challenger and a polynomial time (and space) adver-
sary A. First, the Challenger chooses sets of users U , issuers I, and verifiers V , a sound pseudonym
system and a security parameter k. On input U, I, V, k, he runs init and gives the set U of users
to A. A then chooses two users u0, u1 ∈ U and gives them to the Challenger. The Challenger now
flips an unbiased random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and makes ub execute peprotu,o,p with some organisation
o ∈ (I ∪ V ). He then gives o’s private information (including the protocol view and the resulting
pseudonym p) to A.
Game 5 (pseudonym indistinguishability): A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. We say that A wins the
game iff b′ = b.
Definition 5 A pseudonym system is said to offer indistinguishability of pseudonyms iff no ad-
versary A can win the above game with probability Pr > 1/2 + ²(k), for any negligible function ².
Theorem 1 If a sound pseudonym system offers pseudonym unlinkability then it also offers
pseudonym indistinguishability.
Proof Suppose the converse, i.e. suppose the pseudonym system offers pseudonym unlink-
ability but does not offer pseudonym indistinguishability. Given Ai, an adversary that breaks
pseudonym indistinguishability, we construct Au, an adversary that breaks pseudonym unlinka-
bility, as follows. While playing Game 4 (unlinkability) with the Challenger, Au plays the role of
the Challenger in Game 5 (indistinguishability) with Ai.
Choose a negligible function ². Let µ(k) =
√
²(k)/2, which, by definition, is also negligible. In
Game 4, Au corrupts all but two users, say u0 and u1, and one organisation, say o, i.e. (U − Uˆ) =
{u0, u1} and Iˆ∪ Vˆ = {o}. Then Au issues runpeprot(o) queries until three pseudonyms, say p1, p2
and p3, are established between o and {u0, u1}. Au does not issue any other queries.
Au then plays three instances of Game 5 (indistinguishability) with Ai; in all these games he
defines the set of users to be U = {u0, u1} and the collection of organisations to be (I ∪V ) = {o}.
Au will use Ai’s ability to win instances of Game 5 in order to win, with non-negligible probability,
the instance of Game 4. To this end, in the first instance of Game 5, he gives the pseudonym
p1 together with o’s private information and corresponding peprot view to Ai. Similarly, in the
second and third instances he gives p2 and p3 respectively (together with o’s private information
and corresponding peprot views) to Ai. Denote Ai’s output occurring in the three instances of
Game 5 by b1, b2 and b3 respectively. Now, since we have assumed that Ai breaks pseudonym
indistinguishability, we suppose that Ai wins all instances of Game 5 with probability 1/2+ δ(k),
where δ(k) > µ(k) for all sufficiently large k.
Au then selects j, j′ ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j 6= j′, such that bj = bj′ , where the pair (j, j′) exists by the
pigeonhole principle, and outputs (pj , pj′). Now, since bj = bj′ and f(pj), f(pj′) ∈ {u0, u1}, we
know that f(pj) = f(pj′) if either (f(pj) = ubj and f(pj′) = ubj ) or (f(pj) 6= ubj and f(pj′) 6= ubj ).
Hence:
Pr(f(pj) = f(pj′)) = Pr(f(pj) = ubj ) ·Pr(f(pj′) = ubj )
+ Pr(f(pj) 6= ubj ) ·Pr(f(pj′) 6= ubj )
= (1/2 + δ(k))2 + (1/2− δ(k))2
= 1/2 + 2δ(k)2
> 1/2 + 2µ(k)2 (for all sufficiently large k)
= 1/2 + ²(k)
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where ² was assumed to be negligible. Thus Au breaks unlinkability, contradicting our assumption,
and the result follows. ¤
2.7 Anonymity of users
Consider a sound pseudonym system that offers pseudonym unlinkability. The owner u ∈ (U − Uˆ)
of pseudonym p (u = f(p)) is hidden in the anonymity set U − Uˆ because, from A’s point of view,
any user in that set could potentially be the owner of p. The effective size of the anonymity set,
however, depends on the probability distribution D according to which users are selected during
pseudonym establishment. Using the information-theoretic anonymity metric of [8, 9], this is given
by −Σp∈P∗∗Pr(f(p) = u) log2[Pr(f(p) = u)] and is maximised if D is the uniform distribution.
In this case the effective size of the anonymity set for all pseudonyms is log2 |U − Uˆ |. It is worth
observing that, in the general case, it makes sense to consider the anonymity of the user while
acting using a particular pseudonym. In other words, it is likely that the anonymity a user enjoys
will depend on the pseudonym under which he is acting.
The above measure of anonymity only applies to a naive adversary; it only takes into account
the a priori knowledge (i.e. the distribution D). After observing the system for some time, in
the sense of Game 4, A may decrease the unlinkability between pseudonyms. This decrease in
unlinkability yields an a posteriori probability distribution D′, that A is able to construct using
deductions that he can make due to the scheme’s soundness. While it is the distribution D′ that
defines the (effective) size of the anonymity set in which users are hidden (while acting under one
of their pseudonyms), this does not necessarily mean that a reduction in unlinkability implies a
reduction in anonymity in the theoretical definition of the term. Of course, in practice, any linking
of pseudonyms is likely to lead to an increased risk of loss of anonymity because of ‘out of scope’
attacks. As a result, unlinkability is a property of great importance in its own right.
3 Future work and concluding remarks
In this paper we have introduced a complexity theoretic model for anonymous credential systems.
We have formally defined the notions of pseudonym owner protection, credential unforgeability,
credential non-transferability and pseudonym unlinkability. A key challenge is thus to construct
scheme(s) that meet the definitions in this model, and/or to prove, under appropriate assumptions,
the security of existing ones. There is, however, room to refine and extend the model itself;
determining the probability P¯ by which colluding organisations should be bound when trying to
correlate pseudonyms, given a specific history of events in the system, is clearly of importance.
Naive strategies for computing P¯ appear to be of exponential complexity. Hence, incorporating
efficient strategies for computing, approximating or bounding P¯ into the model is a desirable
refinement. It is envisaged that a refined version of the model described above will combine
complexity theory and probability theory in order to describe the resulting degrees of unlinkability
and anonymity using recently proposed information theoretic metrics [8, 9]. This should provide
further insight into the inherent limits of unlinkability and anonymity in credential systems. We
believe that this will also provide insight as to what such systems have to achieve in order not
to be considered the weakest link with respect to the overall system of which they form part.
An extended version of the model could capture additional properties of pseudonym systems,
for example credentials that can be shown only a limited number of times, or a capability for
anonymity revocation.
Another direction for future research is the analysis of real-world distributionsD of pseudonym-
to-user mappings. This might lead to the description of strategies that users might follow, in a
realistic setting, in order to maximise the unlinkability of their pseudonyms. Given the statistical
properties of the context, this could also lead to descriptions of how long any given pseudonym
can be kept before it should be renewed (if the context allows for this).
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Appendix
The following example scenario illustrates how the adversarial strategies are captured by the
probability bound P¯ . For the sake of simplicity, in the example are only one issuer which issues
only two types of credential, one verifier and three users. It is assumed that, during the first
phase of Game 4 (unlinkability), the adversary corrupts all parties except for the three users, i.e.
I = Iˆ = {i}, V = Vˆ = {v}, U = {u1, u2, u3}, Uˆ = ∅ and T ∗ = Ti = {t1, t2}.
Table 1 depicts the queries that A issues in this example scenario. From the first runcsprot
Table 1: Example scenario: runpeprot queries that returned true.
Time Query type Org Pseudonym Type Outcome
1 runpeprot i p1 n/a true
2 runpeprot i p2 n/a true
3 runpeprot i p3 n/a true
4 runpeprot v p4 n/a true
5 runpeprot v p5 n/a true
6 runpeprot v p6 n/a true
7 runciprot i p1 t1 true
8 runciprot i p1 t2 true
9 runciprot i p2 t1 true
10 runciprot i p2 t2 true
11 runciprot i p3 t1 true
12 runcsprot v p4 t1 true
13 runcsprot v p5 t1 false
14 runcsprot v p6 t1 false
query, A can deduce that f(p4) = f(p1) or f(p4) = f(p2) or f(p4) = f(p3). From the second
runcsprot query, A can deduce that f(p5) 6= f(p1) and f(p5) 6= f(p2) and f(p5) 6= f(p3). From
the third runcsprot query, A can deduce that f(p6) 6= f(p1) and f(p6) 6= f(p2) and f(p6) 6= f(p3).
Combining the three runcsprot queries, A can deduce, with certainty, that f(p4) 6= f(p5) and
that f(p4) 6= f(p6). It follows that p5 and p6 must belong to the two users {u1, u2, u3}− {f(p4)}.
So, the probability Pp5,p6 that f(p5) = f(p6) is 1/2. This happens to be the maximum over all
distinct pseudonym pairs and thus, in the example, P¯ = 1/2. In other words, if A, at the end of the
game, outputs (p5, p6), he has a 50% chance of winning the game. If a (sound) pseudonym system
offers pseudonym unlinkability, then no A should be able to break this bound by a non-negligible
quantity.
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